In this paper, the one-sided secrecy of two-way wiretap channel with feedback is investigated, where the confidential messages of one user through multiple transmissions is guaranteed secure against an external eavesdropper. For one thing, one-sided secrecy satisfies the secure demand of many practical scenarios. For another, the secrecy is measured over many blocks since the correlation between eavesdropper's observation and the confidential messages in successive blocks, instead of secrecy measurement of one block in previous works. Thus, firstly, an achievable secrecy rate region is derived for the general two-way wiretap channel with feedback through multiple transmissions under one-sided secrecy. Secondly, outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region are also obtained. The gap between inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region is explored via the binary input two-way wiretap channels. Most notably, the secrecy capacity regions are established for the XOR channel. Furthermore, the result shows that the achievable rate region with feedback is larger than that without feedback. Therefore, the benefit role of feedback is precisely characterized for two-way wiretap channel with feedback under one-sided secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. The feedback of wiretap channel
The secure communication via a wiretap channel was first studied by Wyner in [1] , where he proved the possibility to achieve a positive secrecy transmission rate without any private key. Wyner studied a noisy degraded broadcast channel and determined its secrecy capacity, defined to be the maximum transmission rate under a weak secrecy constraint (i.e., the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper is vanishing). Later, Csiszár and Körner extended Wyner's work to the general broadcast wiretap channel with a confidential message [2] .
Notably, in wiretap channel, the positive secrecy rate demands that the legitimate receiver should have a better observation than the eavesdropper does [1] , [2] . Whereas, in case of a strong eavesdropper who has a better channel than the legitimate receiver does, the works of Maurer, Ahlswede and Csiszár have shown that a positive secret key generation rate can be achieved by establishing a public feedback channel [3] , [4] . Thereafter, inspired by the benefit of feedback, a large number of works investigated the role of feedback in various wiretap channel [5] - [10] . Considering the usage of feedback signal, one class of works sends the feedback back to the channel in order to help confuse the eavesdropper. For example, Ahlswede and Cai [5] demonstrated that the noiseless feedback from the legitimate receiver to the transmitter can increase the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel. Lai, El Gamal, and Poor [9] , studied the modulo-additive wiretap channel, where Eve receives the modulo-sum of the source signal, the feedback signal, and the noise. They showed that if Bob jams Eve completely, then Alice can send messages securely at the capacity of the channel to Bob. Another class of works combines the feedback signal and
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secrecy rate region is larger than that without feedback. Hence, the benefit role of feedback is precisely characterized through multiple transmissions for two-way wiretap channel with one-sided secrecy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide the general system model together with the preliminary definitions which will be utilized throughout the paper. An achievable one-sided secrecy rate region and an outer bound on the one-sided secrecy capacity region are proposed in Section III-A. These results are explored in the binary input two-way wiretap channel in Section IV. To enhance the flow of the paper, the detailed proofs are collected in the appendices. The full-duplex two-way wiretap channel is shown in Fig. 1 , where two legitimate users intend to exchange messages with each other in the presence of an external eavesdropper, and each of users is equipped with a transmitter and a receiver that can operate simultaneously. In this paper, we focus on the one-sided secrecy, where only the messages from the user is kept confidential from the eavesdropper. Without loss of generality, assume that only the message from the legitimate user 1 should be kept secure, while the message from user 2 is an open message. In this paper, the propose Markov block coding scheme involves b transmissions, during which the confidential messages are sent from 2nd to the b-th transmission. We call each transmission one block. Before introduce the system, we first introduce the notations and terminologies used later.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Model
User 1 User 2 M 2 Decoder 1 Main Channel Decoder 2M 1 M 1 Encoder 1 Encoder 2 M 2
Wiretap Channel
• C 1 , C 2 are the codebooks of user 1 and user 2, respectively. • Similarly, • Z j = (Z(1), Z(2), · · · , Z(j)) denotes the messages received by the eavesdropper from j blocks, where
is the n length message received in the j-th block.
Suppose M 1 , M 2 to be the message sets of user 1 and user 2, respectively; X 1 , X 2 to be the finite channel input alphabets at user 1 and user 2, respectively; Y 1 , Y 2 , Z are the channel output alphabets at user 1, user 2 and the eavesdropper, respectively.
The discrete memoryless two-way wiretap channel is characterized by the transition probability distribution p(y 1 , y 2 , z|x 1 , x 2 ), where x 1 ∈ X 1 , x 2 ∈ X 2 are the channel inputs from user 1 and 2; y 1 ∈ Y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y 2 and z ∈ Z are channel outputs at user 1, user 2 and the eavesdropper.
Suppose in block j − 1, the channel output at user 1 and user 2 are Y n 1 (j − 1) and Y n 2 (j − 1), respectively. User 1 decodes Y n 1 (j − 1) and obtains the messages from user 2, part of which was taken as the feedback signal for next block denoted by Y n f (j − 1). In block j, the legitimate user 1 wants to transmit a confidential message M 1 ∈ M 1 to user 2. According to the feedback Y n f (j − 1) and M 1 , the corresponding codeword X n 1 ∈ X 1 is chosen and sent at a secure rate R 1s = 1 n H(M 1 ). The legitimate user 2 wants to transmit a non-secure message M 2 (j) ∈ M 2 to user 1. The corresponding codeword X n 2 ∈ X 2 is sent at a transmission rate
, n) code for the two-way channel consists of the following.
• Two independent message sets M 1 = {1, 2, . . . , 2 nR1s } and M 2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2 nR2 }.
• For each transmission, two messages: M 1 and M 2 are independent and uniformly distributed over M 1 and M 2 , respectively.
• Two stochastic encoders, f 1 at user 1:
which maps the message M 1 (j) ∈ M 1 and feedback signal Y 1 (j − 1) to a codeword X n 1 (j) ∈ X n 1 , and f 2 at user 2, for each transmission:
• Two decoders, g 1 at user 1, for each transmission: (Y The two-way communication is governed by reliability and secrecy. The former is measured by the error probability and the secrecy levels, respectively. The average error probabilities of decoding at legitimate user 1 and 2 are defined as
The one-sided secrecy of the whole b blocks is defined as
where
} is the confidential messages from the 2nd to the b-th block; M 1 (j) denotes the n length message in the j-th block; Z b is the received messages at the eavesdropper in b blocks.
Remark 1.
Note that the joint secrecy [15] , [16] is defined in one block as
where M 1 and M 2 are the message in one transmission of user 1 and user 2, respectively.
Comparing the one-sided secrecy constraint (2) with the joint secrecy constraint (3), the joint secrecy requires the information leakage rate of both the messages M 1 and M 2 is demanded vanishing, while the one-sided secrecy requires the information leakage rate of the messages M 1 )
Definition 1. The rate pair (R 1s , R 2 ) is said to be achievable under one-sided secrecy, if there exists a sequence of (2 nR1s , 2 nR2 , n) 
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we establish an achievable one-sided secrecy rate region for the two-way wiretap channel with feedback through multiple transmissions. An outer bound on secrecy capacity is also derived.
A. One-sided security with cooperative coding
In order to bound the leakage rate through multiple transmissions, we first give the following lemma.
random sequences of two users, and each distributed according to
Let L 1 , L 2 be random indexes with an arbitrary probability mass function. If
Proof: See Appendix A. Based on the lemma 1, considering the one-sided information leakage over b blocks, i.e. (2), we establish the following achievable secrecy rate region for the two-way wiretap channel with feedback through multiple transmissions. Theorem 1. For the two-way wiretap channel with feedback under one-sided secrecy constraint, an achievable secrecy rate region is given by
where P denotes the set of all distribution of the random variables
Proof: See the proof in Appendix B. Here, we outline the proof to illustrate the main ideas. Our coding scheme involves the transmission of b − 1 independent messages over b n-transmission blocks.
• During the b blocks, user 1 sends a confidential message M 1 (j) from the block j = 2 to the block j = b. For each transmission, the message
] with R 1s = R 1u + R 1s . R 1u , R 1s are the transmission rates of M 1u (j) and M 1s (j), respectively, and R 1s denotes the secure transmission rate of user 1. User 2 sends a confidential key
and K(j), respectively.
• The codebook of user 1 consists 2 nR1 randomly generated i.i.d. sequences u
• In the first block, user 2 randomly selects a codeword u
, and generates the channel input x
. User 1 does not send any message in the first block, only decodes the key K 2 (1) at the end of the first block. Such that in the first block R 1u = R 1s = R 2 = 0. However, the impact on the whole achievable rate diminishes as the number of blocks b → ∞.
received from the previous block from user 2, i.e.
On the other hand, user 2 sends a key K 2 (j) in addition to the public message
In the coding scheme, the cooperative jamming is used to improve the secrecy rate of the confidential message of user 1 by the jamming from user 2. The cooperative jamming can be interpreted by channel prefixing mechanism [17] , which means prefixing an artificial discrete memoryless channel before the communication channel. In the proposed coding scheme, the codewords u n 1 and u n 2 are drawn from two random binning codebooks, and passed into two prefixing channels to generate the channel inputs x n 1 and x n 2 , respectively.
• Each decoder uses the joint typical decoding together with the knowledge of its own codewords. In each block, the legitimate user decodes the channel output and obtains the message from the other user with rather small average error probability.
• From block 2 to block b, b − 1 confidential messages (M 1 ) b 2 are sent and should be kept secure from the eavesdropper. The one-sided secrecy constraint through the whole b block is measured by
Applying theorem 1 to a special two-way channel where the legitimate users and eavesdropper have the same channel output,
i.e. Y 1 = Y 2 = Z, we have the following corollary. Y 1 = Y 2 = Z, an achievable one-sided secrecy rate region is the union of non-negative rate pairs (R 1s , R 2 ) ∈ R In 1 satisfying
B. An outer bound of two-way wiretap channel Theorem 2. For the two-way wiretap channel with feedback under one-sided secrecy constraint, an outer bound on secrecy capacity region is
where P denotes the set of all distribution of the random variables U , V , X 1 , X 2 satisfying
is the region of rate pairs (R 1s , R 2 ) for p ∈ P, satisfying
Proof: See the proof in Appendix C.
Corollary 2. For the two-way wiretap channel, if the legitimate users and eavesdropper have the same channel output, i.e.
Y 1 = Y 2 = Z, the outer bound on secrecy capacity region is the union of non-negative rate pairs
Applying the outer bound given in (9), we have
where (a) follows from Z = Y 2 ; (b) is due to the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy. A similar proof can be applied to show that R 1s ≤ H(X 1 |Z).
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we consider the binary-input two-way wiretap channels for numerical illustrations. In particular, we assume that all the terminals have the same observations, i.e.,
If restricting to the binary-input (i.e., x 1 , x 2 ∈ {0, 1}) and binary-output (i.e., y 1 = y 2 = z ∈ {0, 1}) deterministic two-way channels, there are in total 16 transition possibilities. Among them, only two transition possibilities could have positive transmission rates at both legitimate users. The transmission diagrams of these channels are shown in Fig. 2 (a) and (b), referred as the binary Multiplying channel (BMC) and the XOR channel, respectively. If allowing ternary outputs (i.e., y 1 = y 2 = z ∈ {0, 1, 2}), the Adder channel, as shown in Fig. 2 (c) , is also interesting. For each channel, the numerical result consists of the achievable secrecy rate region with feedback (according to Theorem 1), the achievable secrecy rate region without feedback and the outer bound on secrecy capacity (according to Corollary 2). 
A. Binary Multiplying channel
The transmission diagrams of BMC is shown in Fig. 2 (a) , where the channel output is represented by
By Theorem 1, the achievable secrecy rate region R , which indicates the benefit of feedback in improving the secrecy rate in two-way wiretap channel. This phenomenon is more obviously for the binary XOR channel.
However the gap between the achievable rate region R Co−in and the outer bound R O is still large.
B. Binary XOR channel
The channel is shown in Fig. 2 (b) , where the channel output is represented by In Fig. 4 , both R Co−in and R Ind−in can achieve the maximum transmission rate i.e., max R 1s = max R 2 = 1. Specially, the point (R 1s , R 2 ) = (1, 0) can be achieved by C 2 ∼ Bern(1), X 2 ∼ Bern(1/2) and C 1 = X 1 ∼ Bern(1/2). At this point, user 2 is transmitting random bits (i.e., X 2 ∼ Bern(1/2)) but messages (since C 2 ∼ Bern(1) and thus R 2 = 0). These random bits work as the cooperative jamming to help the secret transmission of user 1. In this way, the secret transmission rate R 1s is increased. Note that, according to Corollary 2, the outer bound satisfies R 1s ≤ 1, R 2 ≤ 1, coinciding with R Co−in . Therefore, for the Binary XOR channel, the one-sided secrecy capacity region is established.
C. Adder channel
The channel is shown in Fig. 2 (c) , where the channel output is represented by Similar to the behavior at the BMC, the achievable rate region R
Co−in
with feedback is larger than R Ind−in without feedback. Under the one-sided secrecy constraint, the maximum achievable rates at both users are max R 1s = 0.5 and max R 2 = 1, respectively. Remarkably, for user 1, there is 50% rate loss compared to the maximum transmission rate in case of no secrecy constraint.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: For the simultaneous joint typical decoding, we first define the following events:
Based on the definition of the events above, we have the following properties.
• By LLN, the first event P {E = 1} = P {E} tends to zero as n → ∞.
• For event E 1 , define
• For event E 2 , define
n(R1+R2−I(U1U2;Z)+δ(ε)) .
• For event E 3 , define
n(R2−I(U2;ZU1)+δ(ε)) .
• For event E 4 , define
Define E = 1 if E occurs. E = 0 if events E 1 occures and any of E 2 , E 3 , E 4 occur.
Hence,
where (a) follows from that if
Therefore,
where (a) the second term follows from that H(
, and the third term follows from the above (10); (b) follows from that
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The transmission is performed for B blocks of length n, where both B and n are sufficiently large. With fixed probabilities density function p(q), p(u 1 |q) and p(u 2 |q), the random code generation is described as follows. is then sent to two users before the communication.
• User 1: For a given distribution p(u 1 |q) and the sequence q n , randomly generate i.i.d. sequences u
• User 2: For a given distribution p(u 2 |q) and the sequence q
B. Encoding
We use block coding scheme to transmit messages over b transmissions blocks. In the first block, only user 2 sends a key message K 2 (1) to user 1. The user 2 randomly selects an index l 2 ∈ C 2 (M 2 (1), K 2 (1)); and uses the corresponding u
And send the symbols x n 2 (1) to user 1. In the next block j ≥ 2, the encoding scheme is described as follows. Suppose that user 1 intends to send the confidential message M 1 (j) = (M 1u (j), M 1s (j)). Then it encodes the message in the following steps.
Suppose that user 2 intends to send the message M 2 (j), and the key
C. Decoding
In the j-th block, user 1 declares thatM 2 (j) is sent by user 2 if u
D. Reliability
Assume that M 1s (j) = 1, M 1u (j) = 1, M 2 (j) = 1, K 2 (j) = 1 are sent, and the corresponding codeword u
First we consider the error probability at user 1. A decoding error happens at user 1 if at least one of the following events occur 1) E 11 : Given q n , the codeword u n 2 (1) and (x n 1 , y n 1 ) are not jointly typical, i.e.
Hence, P (E 1 ) at user 1 can be bounded by
where (a) follows from the LLN; and (b) is by the packing lemma [15] 
Similarly. for user 2, the error events are defined as follows
By the union bound, the error probability P (E 2 ) at user 2 are
where (a) follows from the LLN; and (b) is by the packing lemma [15] if taking R 1 ≤ I(U 1 ; Y 2 |X 2 , Q).
E. Information Leakage Rate
Now we bound the information leakage rate through b blocks by the block coding scheme. During the whole b blocks, from
b 2 are sent and should be kept secure from the eavesdropper. Here we use I((M 1 )
to denote the information leakage through the whole b blocks, and the information leakage rate are considered averaged over the codes.
where (a) follows that
where (a) follows M 1 (j) is independent of past transmissions Z j−1
, given K 2 (j).
We bound the two terms separately in (11).
• Consider the first term of (11)
, data processing, and conditioning reduces entropy.
, and
where (b1) follows from Markov chain
where (c1) follows the Z(j) is independent with
follows from the following three terms. Firstly,
The third term follows Lemma 1 that
• Next we bound the second term of (11) .
where (a) follows the same analysis if (12) 
F. Rate Analysis
Consider all the conditions are fulfilled to keep confidential messages transmission.
After the Fourier-Motzkin elimination, the achievable secrecy rate region are the union of non-negative rate pairs (R 1s , R 2 ) 
